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4Abstract
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was a prime example for the negative impact of manipula-
tion and propaganda discourses which incited a large section of the Hutu population to kill 
approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The project asked if and how today,
more than a decade after the genocide, the antagonistic relationships between the parties
to the conflict have changed and whether sustainable peace is possible in the future. The 
overall object of analysis was thus the process of conflict transformation in Rwanda.
Against this backdrop, it analysed the impact of various peacebuilding discourses, leading
to two objectives:
Objective 1: Development of a framework for the analysis of conflict transformation
Even though peacebuilding has been central to peace and conflict studies for some time, 
the question of how the transformation from war to peace can be assessed is rarely ever
asked, let alone discussed. The theoretical objective of the project was therefore to de-
velop a framework for the evaluation of conflict transformation processes in post-conflict
societies. To this end, the project took a lead from contemporary studies on the construc-
tion of enemies in discourse. It analysed if and how enmity can be ‘un-constructed’, i.e.
reduced discursively.
Objective 2: Assessment of the impact of peacebuilding discourses on conflict transforma-
tion in Rwanda
In Rwanda in 1994, the impact of enmity discourses and hate speech made it possible for 
people to murder their own community members and sometimes even relatives. Against
this backdrop, it can be assumed that discourses on inclusion, coexistence and reconcilia-
tion lead to the opposite effect of transforming the divided society so that sustainable 
peace becomes a possibility. The project examined to what extent this is the case in post-
genocide Rwanda. It analysed various peacebuilding efforts by internal and external
agents in order to reveal what discourses about dealing with the past they promote, how
these discourses impact on the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi and whether they lead 
to a long-term transformation of the conflict.
To this end Between Past and Future analysed the unification discourse of the Rwandan
government, discourses about national commemorations and remembering, local dis-
courses about the past, the national transitional justice discourse based on the village tri-
bunals Gacaca as well as the role of the international community in shaping these
processes. It concluded that rather than leading to conflict transformation many of the
discourses produce and reproduce the antagonistic relationship, standing in the way of future
peace and security. The following shall discuss each of these aspects in turn. 
5Zusammenfassung
Der ruandische Genozid von 1994 war ein Paradebeispiel für das Wirken von Manipula-
tions- und Propagandadiskursen, die einen großen Teil der zivilen Hutubevölkerung zum 
Mord an ca. 800.000 Tutsi und moderaten Hutu aufstachelten. Das Forschungsprojekt un-
tersuchte, ob und wie sich heute, über ein Jahrzehnt nach dem Völkermord, die Beziehun-
gen zwischen den Konfliktparteien Hutu und Tutsi verändert haben und inwieweit diese 
Veränderungen sich als Schritte zur Entfeindung der beiden Volksgruppen erfassen las-
sen. Untersuchungsgegenstand war demnach der Stand der Friedenskonsolidierung in 
Ruanda. Zwei Ziele standen im Mittelpunkt des vorliegenden Projektes: 
Zielsetzung 1: Entwicklung einer Methode zur Analyse von Konflikttransformation 
Obwohl Friedenskonsolidierung seit geraumer Zeit Gegenstand der Friedens- und Konflikt-
forschung ist, wird die Frage, mit Hilfe welcher Methoden die Transformation vom Krieg 
zum Frieden erfasst und eingeschätzt werden kann, kaum gestellt, geschweige denn erör-
tert. Das theoretische Ziel des Projekts war daher, einen Ansatz zur Evaluierung von Kon-
flikttransformationsprozessen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Friedenskonsolidierung in 
Nachbürgerkriegsgesellschaften zu entwickeln. Zu diesem Zweck knüpfte das Projekt an 
vorliegende Studien zur Konstruktion von Feindbildern an. Es untersuchte, inwieweit 
Feindbilder diskursiv abgebaut und womöglich sogar ins Positive gewendet werden und 
wie die entsprechenden Transformationsprozesse erfasst werden können. 
Zielsetzung 2: Empirische Untersuchung diskursiver Konflikttransformation am Beispiel 
Ruandas 
In Ruanda haben Verfeindungsdiskurse es möglich gemacht, dass Nachbarn ihre Nach-
barn und deren Kinder ermordeten. Theoretisch ist davon auszugehen, dass Versöh-
nungsdiskurse ebenso wirkmächtig sein können wie Verfeindungsdiskurse. Das Projekt 
untersuchte, wieweit die Verfeindungsdiskurse, die dem Genozid zugrunde lagen, in der 
Folgezeit in eine Transformation des Konflikts überführt worden sind und welche Wirkung 
die diskursive Behandlung der Vergangenheit gezeitigt hat. Das Ziel bestand darin heraus-
zufinden, ob und inwieweit die heutigen Diskurse über die Vergangenheit und die Zukunft 
Ruandas die ursprünglichen Konfliktlinien zwischen Hutu und Tutsi aufbrechen oder repro-
duzieren. Dies wurde anhand der Praktiken und Projekte einer Reihe von potentiell frie-
densbildenden Akteuren untersucht.  
Between Past and Future analysierte daher den Vereinheitlichungsdiskurs der ruandischen 
Regierung, Diskurse über nationale Gedenkveranstaltungen und Erinnern, örtliche Diskur-
se über die Vergangenheit, die nationalen Transitional Justice Diskurse über die Dorftribu-
nale Gacaca sowie den Einfluss der internationalen Gemeinschaft auf diese Prozesse. 
Das Projekt zog den Schluss, dass die meisten Diskurse weniger zur Transformation des 
Konflikts als zu dessen Reproduktion beitragen und somit einem zukünftigen nachhaltigen 
Frieden im Wege stehen. 
1 Background to the Project 
The research project ‘Between Past and Future. An Assessment of the Transition from 
Conflict to Peace in Post-genocide Rwanda’ was funded by the Deutsche Stiftung 
Friedensforschung (DSF) and hosted at the Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktfor-
schung (HSFK).1 Beginning in January 2003 and conducted over a period of 28 months, it 
had a strong focus on fieldwork. All in all, ten months were spent in Rwanda in order to 
conduct over 150 interviews with national and international experts as well as three months 
of intensive field research in the districts of Gikongoro and Nyamata, where numerous in-
terviews and group discussions were held. The fieldwork was assisted by two Rwandan 
students who also interpreted the interviews conducted in Kinyarwanda. Whenever pos-
sible, we recorded the interviews and later transcribed and translated them into English. 
Given the nature of the subject, it was however not always possible to use a dictaphone so 
that we took extensive notes instead. All interviews were open and unstructured, took be-
tween one and two hours, and were led in a conversational style to create some trust be-
tween the interviewees and us. Given the community aspect of rural life, interviews were 
sometimes conducted with individuals but also often with larger groups, at times leading to 
a vibrant discussion between mostly homogeneous kinfolk. 
In addition to random sampling, i.e. walking from one homestead to another, we used the 
method of purpose sampling by identifying population groups relevant for your research 
and deliberately seeking them out through snowball or chain sampling. Groups we pur-
posely included were rural survivors, returnees, released prisoners, families of prisoners, 
representatives of survivor organisations, local authorities such as elders or teachers, me-
morial site staff, as well as people living in the immediate surroundings of a genocide me-
morial who were of Hutu ethnicity.2
While the effect of the genocide in the fieldwork areas Gikongoro (Gikongoro district) and 
Nyamata (Bugesera district) was similarly strong, the locations differ in their historical de-
velopment and their social composition. Gikongoro is situated in the southwest of the coun-
try, bordering the Democratic Republic of Congo, and has always been neglected by 
Rwandan governments. The district itself was created shortly after independence through 
attaching areas with a high Tutsi population (around the former royal capital Nyanza) to a 
highland largely inhabited by Hutu in order to weaken Tutsi influence.3 Due to its remote 
location, but also deliberate policies, in the early 1990s, the town Gikongoro was fairly 
small, the district did not have any secondary schools and it was largely neglected by in-
ternational development projects. Compared to other regions of the country, this remains 
the case to date. Moreover, agriculture, the main source of livelihood, is difficult due to the 
hilly topography, and the soil does not yield many products. 
According to local population data, before the genocide 17.5% of the population was Tutsi, 
however with a very unequal geographic distribution.4 In the 1960s and in 1973 Gikongoro 
was the place of serious violence against Tutsi, but there were no major attacks after the 
October 1990 invasion by the RPF.5 In 1994, though, the genocide was very severe and it 
is estimated that 75% of all Tutsi were killed.6
1  I am very grateful to Lothar Brock for his valuable support and advice throughout the project. 
2  Even though it is not possible to ask Rwandans what ethnic group they belong to, our interviewees were always 
quick in indirectly indicating their ethnic belonging. 
3  HRW 1999, p. 303. 
4  Verpoorten 2005, p. 334. 
5  HRW 1999, p. 304. 
6  Verpoorten 2005, p. 334. 
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Our other research location, Nyamata, is situated in Bugesera district south of the capital 
Kigali. The area is prone to draughts and diseases. In order to reduce their prevalence in 
the country, after independence the Hutu government forcefully moved Tutsi from different 
parts of Rwanda to Bugesera - which was considered to be a health risk - turning it into a 
region with a predominantly Tutsi population. A few decades later, numerous Hutu from the 
overpopulated northwest of Rwanda were relocated to Bugerea, leading to acute land 
shortage.7
Prior to the genocide, Bugesera was the site of a number of massacres on Tutsi, for in-
stance after a failed attempted of armed exile Tutsi to invade the country in 1963/64, as 
well as during the RPF invasion in 1992, when about 300 Tutsi were killed. Participation in 
the latter has been explained by a ‘hunger for land’ of the relocated Hutu from the north-
west.8 In 1994, Nyamata, and Bugesera more generally, belonged to the first areas ‘libe-
rated’ by the RPF. As a consequence, there was an immediate influx of exile-Tutsi from 
Burundi - even while the genocide was still continuing in other parts of the country - which 
is noticeable today. 
Regarding our field research, the most significant difference between Gikongoro and Nya-
mata was their social composition: while our random samples led us to mainly Hutu 
households in Gikongoro, in Nyamata many interviewees were Tutsi, both survivors and 
returned exiles from Burundi. Despite these differences, the critical similarity between  
Gikongoro and Nyamata is the severeness of the genocide and we did not notice any ma-
jor divergences in the responses to our interview questions between the regions. 
We further surveyed 21 Kigali-based national and international organisations mandated 
with contributing to peacebuilding and participated in countless conferences and work-
shops held by members of the international community, the Government of Rwanda and 
the National University of Rwanda. Although it was initially envisaged to use participatory 
research methods to assess the work and impact of local civil peacebuilding projects, the 
delicate nature of the Rwandan context did not allow its application. Participatory ap-
proaches were however used in other contexts, e.g. to assess the government’s unity and 
reconciliation strategy as well as the discourses of the international development commu-
nity. This included - at times actively - participating in seminars, workshops and other 
events organised by both groups, as well as accompanying them during field trips, leading 
long, collegial discussions about dealing with the past and, regarding the latter, getting 
involved in political lobby work. 
7  Pottier 2003, p. 12. 
8  Ibid. 
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2 Research Objectives and Questions  
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was a prime example for the negative impact of manipula-
tion and propaganda discourses which incited a large section of the Hutu population to kill 
approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The project asked if and how today, 
more than a decade after the genocide, the antagonistic relationships between the parties 
to the conflict have changed and whether sustainable peace is possible in the future. The 
overall object of analysis was thus the process of conflict transformation in Rwanda. 
Against this backdrop, it analysed the impact of various peacebuilding discourses, leading 
to two objectives: 
a) Development of a framework for the analysis of conflict transformation  
Even though peacebuilding has been central to peace and conflict studies for some time, 
the question of how the transformation from war to peace can be assessed is rarely ever 
asked, let alone discussed. The theoretical objective of the project was therefore to de-
velop a framework for the evaluation of conflict transformation processes in post-conflict 
societies. To this end, the project took a lead from contemporary studies on the construc-
tion of enemies in discourse. It analysed if and how enmity can be ‘un-constructed’, i.e. 
reduced discursively. Importantly, though, it was not the objective of the study to develop a 
particular strategy for conflict transformation, but rather to provide an analytic framework 
against which to assess existing strategies. 
b) Assessment of the impact of peacebuilding discourses on conflict transformation in 
Rwanda 
In Rwanda in 1994, the impact of enmity discourses and hate speech made it possible for 
people to murder their own community members and sometimes even relatives. Against 
this backdrop, it can be assumed that discourses on inclusion, coexistence and reconcilia-
tion lead to the opposite effect of transforming the divided society so that sustainable 
peace becomes a possibility. The project examined to what extent this is the case in post-
genocide Rwanda. It analysed various peacebuilding efforts by internal and external 
agents in order to reveal what discourses about dealing with the past they promote, how 
these discourses impact on the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi and whether they lead 
to a long-term transformation of the conflict. 
To this end Between Past and Future analysed the unification discourse of the Rwandan 
government, discourses about national commemorations and remembering, local dis-
courses about the past, the national transitional justice discourse based on the village tri-
bunals Gacaca as well as the role of the international community in shaping these pro-
cesses. It concluded that rather than leading to conflict transformation many of the dis-
courses produce and reproduce the antagonistic relationship, standing in the way of future 
peace and security. The following shall discuss each of these aspects in turn. 
2.1 Analysing Conflict Transformation 
Building peace after violent conflicts has become popular amongst internal and external 
agents alike. Between Past and Future was based on the argument that, in order to be 
successful, peacebuilding strategies need to lead to the transformation of a violent conflict, 
i.e. to both an agreement about the issues at stake and a process of long-term social 
change. This follows from the idea that conflicts do not simply arise over issues, but over 
8
relationships, too. ‘Disputes … typically operate at two levels: the more or less openly ne-
gotiated level of political demands and interests, and a deeper level of collective experi-
ences, stances, and attitudes integral to the formation of identity’.9 The latter dimension 
determines the relationship between the parties and is deeply embedded in collective 
memory and enshrined in social practice.10 An important role in shaping the interest and 
relationship aspects of conflicts is played by events in which one or all groups have been 
the victims of despotic rule, expulsion, military conquest, or some other form of violence.11
After a violent conflict, if peacebuilding measures are confined simply to an apparently 
‘reasonable’ balance of interests the danger remains that the neglected ‘deeper dimension’ 
of collective experience, traumas and attitudes will manifest itself as an inexplicable ‘irra-
tional’ derangement, such as the outbreak of violence.12
While, after a violent conflict, the ‘balancing of interests’ might be easier to evaluate, as-
sessing changes in the relationship between the parties towards the conflict is a difficult 
task. To respond to this challenge, the study used a discursive approach. The concept 
‘discourse’ refers to text or speech as well as to the totality of socially constructed rules 
that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said or done.13
In other words, discourses are a system of meaningful practises that form the identity of 
subjects and social relations.14 To focus on the discursive construction of identity, in rela-
tion to difference, has become increasingly popular in political theory. Due to its relevance 
for violent conflicts, the debate has been extended to conflict analysis and the 1990s saw a 
proliferation of literature on how social realities like ‘enemies’ are created through dis-
course and language.15 One important aspect emerging out of these discussions is that 
these ‘realities’ are not misperceptions, but part of what constitutes a particular collective 
identity.16
While these approaches have been valuable for understanding why people fight, there is 
so far no literature on using a discursive approach to explore how people transcend their 
antagonism. Does the promotion of a particular discourse construct a new set of rules for 
what can be or done that is less hostile then during times of conflict? Does it create a sys-
tem of meaningful practice that forms less antagonistic identities and social relations? 
Does it aid in transforming the conflict? 
In order to examine the impact of current peacebuilding discourses in Rwanda the re-
search project developed a framework of analysis for the transformation of conflict which is 
based on the concept of hermeneutics.17 The significance of hermeneutics lies in its ability 
to conceptualise two interrelated processes of identity formation: on one the hand, it fo-
cuses on how the parties to the conflict interpret the violent past and what hopes and aspi-
rations - or fears and worries - they have for the future, and, on the other, it illustrates how 
this is linked to the experience of the opposing party to the conflict. In this sense, identities 
are constituted ‘between past and future”.18 The following analytical questions can be iden-
tified:
First, hermeneutics suggests that in order to overcome a conflict, the parties need to 
change aspects of their identity so that they no longer define their own group in demarca-
9  Ropers 1997, p. 8. 
10  Buckley-Zistel 2003, p. 121. 
11  Ropers 1997, p. 8. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Torfing 1999, p. 300. 
14  Howarth 2000, p. 3. 
15  See for instance Campbell 2005, Coker 1997, Shapiro 1997, Suganami 1997, Wilmer 1998. 
16  Weller 2001, p. 49. 
17  For a detailed account see Buckley-Zistel 2006. 
18  This phrase, which also serves as the title of the project, is borrowed from Hannah Arendt. See Arendt 1977. 
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tion of the other. Through altering the way the parties see themselves as well as the former 
enemy, the exclusive structures which gave rise to the conflict are being renegotiated. An 
assessment of conflict transformation should therefore ask if and how this is happening in 
a particular war-torn society. How do people explain their own identity group in relation to 
others?
Secondly, the process of transformation is subject to how communities remember their 
past as well as how they anticipate their future. Research into transformation processes 
should therefore take these aspects into account through asking what tales are being told 
with reference to the beginning and experience of the violent conflict. And how people are 
envisaging their future. 
Thirdly, a transformation process is always susceptible to power hierarchies which deter-
mine the outcome. An analysis therefore has to include the evaluation of political, eco-
nomic and social power relations in both discourse and institutions. 
And fourthly, the transformation must not introduce a new sense of closure which eradi-
cates diversity, potentially leading to a new conflict. Questions to be raised are whether the 
shared meaning developed in the process is homogenising or whether it allows for diffe-
rence. Is the end of a transformation process to create a collective identity, or are communi-
ties able to thrive in their diversity? 
These four aspects help to analyse whether particular discourses promoted by peacebuild-
ing efforts reduce or reproduce the antagonistic relations between the parties to the con-
flict. As for Rwanda, the question was hence, what projects are being conducted to build 
peace, what discourses they invoke and if and how they lead to a transformation of the 
relationship between the parties towards the conflict. 
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3 The Transition from Conflict to Peace in Rwanda 
In many ways, the Rwandan genocide remains an unprecedented example of violence and 
terror at the end of the 20th century. On 7th April 1994, after the attack on the aircraft carry-
ing the Hutu president Juvénal Habyarimana, a well-prepared killing machine moved into 
action in an attempt to extinguish all Tutsi. Within merely 100 days, about 800 000 Tutsi, 
as well as a significant number of Hutu political opponents, were assassinated by Hutu 
militias, government troops and their Hutu community members. 
 Genocide Memorial in Natamara, Nyamata (2003) 
Although tragic, the Rwandan genocide did not happen in a vacuum, but in the midst of a 
democratisation process, following a four-year-long insurgency by the Tutsi-led Rwanda 
Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) of General Paul Kagame, now President of Rwanda. Sparked 
by the insurgency and the subsequent pressure of the international community to share 
power and to allow democratic multi-party elections, Habyarimana’s people incited nation-
wide violence and hate through spreading the fear of a Tutsi victory and the ensuing sup-
pression of all Hutu. Given the history of the country, as shall be illustrated below, these 
hate discourses soon fell on fertile ground, leading even family members to turn against 
each other. 
If the Rwandan society was divided at the beginning of the genocide, the experience of 
bloodshed and terror, which affected everybody, deepened the gap. In today’s post-
genocide environment it is therefore necessary to address the social divisions through 
changing the way Rwandans relate to each other. Failing this, the groups may be receptive 
to renewed manipulation and instigation of violence by political entrepreneurs. The project 
therefore examined a number of peacebuilding efforts and their discourses to assess 
whether they contribute to social change. Crucially, even though it was initially envisaged 
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to analyse civil society projects, in the course of the fieldwork it transpired that Rwanda is 
marked by their absence. Within ten months of fieldwork we only identified a small number 
of projects that directly addressed the antagonistic relationship between Hutu and Tutsi.19
To discuss the causes for this absence would extend the scope of this report. Suffice it to 
say that a combination of government coercion on civil society and the lack of temporal 
distance, funding and freedom of speech have so far prevented such projects from emerg-
ing. Instead of civil projects, Between Past and Future focused on the government’s unifi-
cation discourse, discourses on national commemorations and remembering, transitional 
justice discourses and the peacebuilding discourse of international donors. 
3.1 The Unification Discourses of the Government of Rwanda 
The government’s strategy of conflict transformation is based on the promotion of a na-
tional unity discourse, i.e. a top-down effort to turn the divided society into one collective 
identity.20 Creating a national identity - in particular via the notion of an all inclusive political 
identity, i.e. citizenship - can be a vehicle for overcoming cleavages which have led to vio-
lent conflict in the past. This is done by re-shaping the identity of the parties to the conflict 
through referring to a common past and future and it takes place, inter alia, at the level of 
national commemorations, the re-writing of history and its teaching, as well as through mu-
seums and memorials.21
After its victory, the RPF-led government launched a project of ‘national unity’ and estab-
lished a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) which has as its stated 
objectives to promote unity and reconciliation, to fight divisionism and to embark on a pro-
ject of civic education in order to bring the divided society together.22 The government has 
opted for a discourse of national unity which is based on Rwandan citizenship, effectively 
seeking to change ethnic into civic identity. In the words of the Minister for Good Govern-
ance:
In the social-political Arena, there is still need to have policies, processes and pro-
grams that can create a citizen that is above sectarianism (AMACAKUBIRI). The 
historical process the Rwandan has passed through has created sectarian condi-
tioned Munyarwanda with all the exclusion mentality that goes with it. Such condi-
tioning can not form a basis for the synergetic relationship that is required for social 
advancement. Thinkers and writers, media, folklore and governance practices must 
be aligned to contribute to the process of emancipation. A new culture of national 
identity must be forged and nurtured.23
19  After careful deliberation, it was decided not to analyse their discourses and impact since it was felt that the research 
could be too intrusive and damage the newly developed ties. For a discussion of ethical dilemmas during fieldwork 
after violent conflicts see Buckley-Zistel 2007b. 
20  The following argument has been developed in greater detail in Buckley-Zistel 2006. The analysis is predominately 
based on government publications, public statements, government-run newspapers, interviews with government offi-
cials, conference contributions of government officials as well as participation in government workshops and semi-
nars.
21  See for instance Anderson 1991, Hobsbawm 1983. 
22  NURC 2000. To set up a national reconciliation commission was already an aspect of the Arusha Peace Accord of 
1993.
23  Musoni 2003. 
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3.1.1 Identity, Ethnicity and Citizenship before the Genocide 
The government’s effort to forge a new collective identity is founded in its interpretation of 
the causes for conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, which is based on the social-constructivist 
view that ethnicity has been invented by colonialism.24 Colonial anthropologists introduced 
the now-discredited ‘Hamitic hypothesis’, arguing that Tutsi originate from Ethiopia while 
Hutu belong to the Bantu people and constitute the indigenous population of the country. 
During colonialism, this interpretation of Rwanda’s past was first adopted by Rwandan 
scholars such as Alexis Kagame and then by large parts of the population.25
Moreover, Tutsi, who constitute Rwanda’s monarchy and who, according to the colonial-
ists, bore a physical resemblance to Europeans, were inculcated by the colonialists with 
notions of superiority and used as vehicles for indirect rule, while Hutu were identified as 
common farmers and subsequently suppressed. When independence approached, the 
feeling of inferiority and resentment against Tutsi grew amongst Hutu leading to the so-
called ‘Social Revolution’ of 1959 which marked the end of royal Tutsi supremacy and the 
first pogrom against Tutsi. Many Tutsi fled to neighbouring countries and overseas. After 
independence in 1962, ethnic differences were successfully manipulated for political ends 
by various heads of state, most notably under the presidency of Grègoire Kayibanda 
(1962-1973) as well as in the lead-up to the genocide 1990-1994 under Juvénal Habyari-
mana (1973-1994). Central to the discrimination of Tutsi was the allegation that they were 
alien to Rwanda, rendering them foreign occupants and challenging their rights as citi-
zens.26 ‘The Hamit infiltration of the Bantu country’,27 as it was put at the time, i.e. the por-
trayal of Tutsi as immigrants, led to the equation of citizenship not with residency, but eth-
nicity. Hutu and Twa (the third ethnic group in Rwanda) saw themselves as the indigenous 
population and therefore the true bearers of citizenship rights. Citizenship became exclu-
sively defined through (ethnic) identity and a sense of closure was introduced about who 
was inside and who was outside the nation. This was for instance a core argument of  
Kayibanda who stated in 1959: 
Our movement aims at the Hutu group. It has been offended, humiliated and de-
spised by the Tutsi invader. We must illuminate the mass. We are here to return the 
country to its owners. It is the country of the Bahutus.28
The notion of returning the country to its owners was taken to an extreme in the course of 
the genocide when Tutsi bodies were thrown into the Nyabarongo River so they could float 
back north to their ‘native’ Ethiopia. 
3.1.2 Identity, Ethnicity and Citizenship after the Genocide 
In an effort to undo the negative impact of this divisive interpretation of the country’s past, 
the government has embarked on a project of re-writing the nation’s history. In contrast to  
24  Uvin 2001a. For a discussion of at times competing interpretations of the causes of the genocide see also Kimonyo 
2000.
25  Kagame 1972. 
26  See also Mamdani 2001. 
27  Lacger 1959, p. 57. 
28  Enry 1994, p. 58. Present author’s translation. 
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the above accounts it argues that, prior to colonialism, Rwanda was not divided into diffe-
rent ethnic groups, but that unity prevailed, effectively rendering colonial anthropology and 
indirect rule solely responsible for the division and hence the genocide.29
In the government’s unification discourse, the portrayal of Tutsi as immigrants is replaced 
by socio-economic differences.
In the words of NURC:
Ethnic groups, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa characterised wealth or poverty; they were not 
based on blood. One could shift from being a Twa or a Hutu and become a Tutsi if 
he got rich, if he became poor while he was a Tutsi he was called a Hutu or Twa. 30
Through replacing ethnicity with class the government is attempting to de-ethnicise the
nation. Citizenship is no longer based on ethnic, but on civic identity, i.e. unity under the 
name of ‘Rwandanness’ (Rwanddité) and all mentioning of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa is prohib-
ited or labelled ‘divisionist’. Against the backdrop of the devastating impact of discourses
equating ethnic with civic identity which divided people, the policy of the government to use 
the opposite strategy to bring people together seems logical. As argued by the Secretary
General of the NURC, to focus on similarities carries the promise of sustainable peace. 31
Not only the government is interested in re-writing history, though, but there is also a fierce
debate within society about the right interpretation of the past. To illustrate this struggle, in 
29 See also Eltringham 2004, Longman/Rutagengwa 2004, Pottier 2003.
30 NURC 2000, p. 19.
31 Interview with Fatoum Ndanziga, Secretary General of the NURC, Kigali, 1.12.2003.
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1998 a conference was held at the National University in Butare, provocatively entitled: 
‘Changements politiques survenues en 1959. Oui ou non, y avait-il une révolution?’ [‘The 
Political changes of 1959. Was there a revolution or not?’]. Crucially, at the centre of the 
debate about the right version lies the question of responsibility for the genocide. It is ar-
gued that if, before and during colonialism, Tutsi were indeed the superior race, suppress-
ing Hutu, then the Hutu Social Revolution of 1959 was just and justified, and by implication 
the Hutu self-defence against a new inversion of ‘oppressive’ Tutsi in form of the RPF/A 
insurgency in the early nineties. If, however, there was equality and unity between Hutu 
and Tutsi prior to the arrival of colonialists, both the Social Revolution and the ‘defence’ 
against Tutsi in 1994 were the plot of a few Hutu in order to gain or maintain political 
power. In this context, the government’s unification discourse is not simply a mechanism to 
bring the divided country together, it is also highly political since it aims at legitimising its 
power. Whoever has the final word in this debate controls not only the past, but also the 
future.
3.1.3 Power and Closure 
To return to the hermeneutic framework of analysis introduced above, it is striking that its 
first aspect, the transformation of identity groups so that they no longer define themselves 
in opposition to each other, is also a central concern for the Government of Rwanda. It
also acknowledges that this process is closely related to the interpretation of the past, in 
form of the genocide and its historical preconditions, leading to the promotion of an appar-
ently unifying discourse. 
The government’s strategy provides significant insights into the relationship between iden-
tity, memory, power and closure. For regardless of what interpretation of history is correct, 
the manner in which the government implements and promotes its discourse is highly 
problematic. Even though there is no official history curriculum, the government uses civic 
education projects to spread the message about the pre-colonial unity of Hutu and Tutsi, 
and the future unity of the country, in radio broadcasts, public speeches, songs and Ingan-
dos; i.e. through top-down processes and campaigns.32 The message is clear: Rwandans 
have to unite. That this strategy is a form of propaganda and bears similarities to the hate 
discourses which led to the genocide is willingly admitted by government officials who add 
that while inciting violence against Tutsi was bad brainwashing, their own effort in shaping 
discourses is good and thus legitimate. The mechanisms, though, remain the same. More-
over, the government prohibits any interpretation of the countries past and social composi-
tion that conflicts with its own discourse. This is enshrined in a law against divisionism and 
supervised by NURC. Apart from infringing on freedom of speech in general the law has 
been used to silence the opposition and to manufacture consent. This has, for instance, 
been central to a parliamentary investigation into genocide ideology involving a number of 
critical international and national organisations accused of spreading genocide ideology 
and divisionism, essentially using the promotion of unity as a tool to silence critical 
voices.33 But the use of the government’s power to introduce closure on alternative inter-
pretations of the past and a plural understanding of ethnic belonging bears the danger of 
32 Ingandos are ‘solidarity camps’ which are mandatory to attend for students, released prisoners and returnees from 
the diaspora. 
33  Ad hoc Parliament Commission on Genocide Ideology 2004. 
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new antagonism and resentment since differences are being eradicated and legitimate 
grievances silenced. 
Moreover, it has been argued that the government’s promotion of an all-Rwandan identity 
serves to mask the monopoly of Tutsi military and political power.34 Contrary to the previ-
ous Hutu-dominated regimes, which assimilated the ethnic and political majority and ex-
cluded Tutsi, the RPF-controlled regime founds its legitimacy on an anti-ethnic project of 
national restoration and a radically transformed founding discourse which only works to 
cover-up the predominance of Tutsi in all domains of society.35 In this sense, its unity dis-
course serves the political function of maintaining power. 
3.2 National Commemorations and Remembering 
3.2.1 Chosen Trauma 
After having analysed the national unification policy the study investigated how individual 
groups interpret the genocide and its prelude and how these interpretations effect the con-
stitution of their group identity in relation to the other group.36 In a similar context, Vamik 
Volkan introduces the notion chosen trauma which occurs when a group, after the experi-
ence of a painful event, feels helpless and victimised by another group. He argues that the 
group draws the mental representations or emotional meanings of the traumatic event into 
its very identity, which is then passed on as emotional and symbolic meaning to the next 
generation. For each generation, ‘the description of the actual event is modified; what re-
mains is its role in [...] the group identity.’37 In this sense, chosen trauma is produced by 
and at the same time is productive of a collective identity. The repetition of narratives about 
the traumatic event constructs the group’s identity in opposition to the identity of the oppo-
nent who caused the trauma. In Rwanda, this manifests itself in the way the different 
groups remember the genocide. 
Each year in early April, Rwanda remembers the beginning of the genocide with a national 
commemoration week, including public events at memorial sites, re-burials, media broad-
casts and conferences.38 According to the national commemoration discourse, Tutsi are 
the clear victims of the genocide while Hutu, and some analysts argue all Hutu, are perpe-
trators.39 There is, moreover, a national duty to remember and rumours about mandatory 
participation in commemorations abound. On a general note, national commemorations 
are profoundly political since they silence contrary interpretations of the past; they intro-
duce a sense of closure to the past which does not allow for re-interpreting an event.40 In 
Rwanda, however, despite the government’s commemoration discourse, the past of the 
genocide is still very alive and vibrant for it is subject to constant, albeit informal and pri-
vate, debates over interpretations of the events as well as their representation in form of 
memorials. The following provides what can only be a very generalised account of the  
34  Reyntjens 2004, p. 187. 
35  Brauman et al. 2000, p. 151. 
36  For a more detailed discussion see Buckley-Zistel 2004, Buckley-Zistel 2006, Buckley-Zistel 2007b, forthcoming. 
37  Volkan 1991, p. 26. 
38  For a discussion of the various commemoration events see Brandstetter 2005, Vidal 2004. 
39  Eltringham 2004. 
40  Middleton/Edwards 1990, p. 8. 
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attitudes towards national commemorations and remembering of some of the different 
identity groups. 
For the surviving Tutsi, the genocide not only exterminated their loved ones, but it also 
destroyed their property and many women were infected with AIDS following the use of 
rape as a strategic weapon.41 Today, many struggle hard to make ends meet and some of 
the victims of the genocide belong to the poorest people in the country. A large number of 
the rural impoverished survivors feel neglected by the government; their call for compensa-
tion has so far been ignored, for financial and political reasons, and the traumatic experi-
ence of the past leads to a negative attitude towards justice and reconciliation.42 Since 
living with the experience of violence is central to their identity, commemorating the geno-
cide is of major significance and each year large groups of survivors gather at the numer
ous memorial sites for praye
-
rs.
To them [t]o remember is very important. No one has to forget because it will give 
youth an idea of what happened in Rwanda. If we don’t forget, the genocide can 
never happen again. (Elderly, male survivor, Nyamata) 
It was striking in our interviews how important remembrance was for the survivors and how 
much their choice of trauma constituted their collective identity. Regarding the national 
commemoration week, however, many survivors expressed reservations: given their mar-
ginalisation for the large part of the year they are offended by the national event and feel 
their grievances, so deep and personal, are being used by the government for political 
ends, in particular to once more demonstrate the culpability of the international community 
for not intervening in the massacres.43 In addition, many of the commemoration events and 
41  See for instance African Rights 2004, AVEGA 1999. 
42  For the latter point see Longman et al. 2004, p. 611. 
43  See also Brandstetter 2005. 
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exhibitions reflect less the concerns and ideas of survivors than those of an international 
audience.44 Consequently, many actual victims of the genocide feel the national com-
memorations have little to do with them and prefer to grieve privately in small circles. 
Yet not only survivors question the rationale of the national commemorations, but many 
Hutu, too. With the genocide being a prime example of mass participation about 120,000 
génocidaires, predominately Hutu, were imprisoned some of which have been released in 
recent years after confessing their crimes. Since the Rwandan justice system is severely 
overstretched, and the much expected village tribunals Gacaca have only recently com-
menced their work, most inmates do not have much hope for a fair trial in the near future. 
At home, having a family member in prison is a heavy burden for an impoverished Rwan-
dan household and many Hutu wives struggle, and often fail, to simultaneously support the 
prisoners, cultivate the land and care for the children. Consequently, many of the accused 
and their dependants feel that they, too, are victims of the insurgency and the genocide. 
Moreover, many Hutu died after the genocide in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, in the overcrowded prisons or at the hands of the post-genocide government 
army RPA.45 Having lost husbands, parents or siblings many Hutu do not understand why 
they are not allowed to mourn their dead publicly and why they are not included in the na-
tional commemoration ceremonies, as expressed in the following comments: 
To remember is good, but it should be inclusive. For instance, my parents have 
been killed during the genocide. But when they [the public] remember they remem-
ber only Tutsi, so I am frustrated because they don’t remember my family. (Young, 
rural woman, Nyamata) 
It is important not to forget the past so that we can prevent the future. But the bad 
was not only the genocide but also the Hutu who died in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo of diseases, and also those who were killed in revenge when they came 
back. Nobody has won this war; everybody has lost at least one family member. 
(Elderly man, Ntamara, Nyamata) 
These quotes indicate the contestation of the exclusive ownership of victimhood by the 
Tutsi survivors. For many Hutu, too, trauma plays a role in the constitution of their collec-
tive identity. Importantly, though, Rwanda’s society is not simply split into Hutu and Tutsi, 
or victims and perpetrators, but, like all societies, it has many vibrant and dynamic 
groups.46
This includes people who were not present during the genocide and who are often gener-
ally sympathetic to the commemorations, but see them as a rupture in their daily lives. In 
particular, many Tutsi and their descendents who fled into exile during the 1959 ‘Social 
Revolution’ - so called ‘old-case-load refugees’ - and who returned after the genocide full 
of hope to the ‘promised land’ prefer forgetting over remembering. The annual reviving of 
horrific memories frequently raises mistrust amongst colleagues and friends, and is re-
garded as a recurring disruption of their efforts to build a new country. Instead, many prefer 
introducing a form of closure through putting the past to rest and looking forward to a posi-
tive future.
To return to the framework of analysis introduced above, the way the genocide is remem-
bered through the national commemorations maintains a rather clear delineation of the 
various identity groups in Rwanda. The particular choice of trauma delineates ‘us’ from 
‘them’. It reveals a dialectic relationship between memory and identity: memory is  
44  Buckley-Zistel 2004. 
45  Human Rights Watch estimates between 25,00 to 45,000 fatalities. de Forge 1999. 
46  For a more comprehensive overview see Hofmeier 2003. 
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produced by as well as productive of collective identities.47 In Rwanda, the particular ver-
sion of memory derives from the group’s self-perception which at the same time reinforces 
it. This self-perception is often in contrast to the national commemoration discourse, which 
is thus potentially less unifying than an obstacle to the conflict transformation process. 
The study thus concluded that how people remember the genocide, what trauma they 
choose and what demands they derive from this memory differs widely and reflects and 
reproduces the tensions prevailing in contemporary Rwandan society. Crucially, though, 
due to the government’s unification discourse, disagreement about the current versions of 
remembrance cannot be articulated publicly which stands in the way of a frank and open 
dialogue between all parties. As illustrated above, the government introduced a sense of 
closure on conflicting interpretations of the past which prohibits all mentioning of ethnicity, 
undermining group specific remembrance. Articulating the difference on memory, however, 
would be the first requirement to recall a memory of the genocide and its causes in which 
all parties can recognise themselves and which could promote the transformation of the 
conflict. The exchange of different interpretations of the past could lead to a process of 
narrative mediation in which the parties realise and acknowledge various forms of guilt and 
responsibility.48
47  Antze/Lambek 1996, p. xviii. 
48  For a comparison of Germany and Rwanda in this regard see Buckley-Zistel 2005b. 
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3.3 Local Discourses and Forgetting 
While the previous sections illustrated the findings about the top-down, government dis-
course on unification and commemoration, the following summarises how people deal with 
the past at a micro, societal level. In this context, it is important to acknowledge that if 
memory has a unifying potential, so has forgetting.49 Whole societies may choose to forget 
uncomfortable knowledge and turn it into ‘open secrets’, which are known by all, and know-
ingly not known.50 Through ‘forgetting’ a whole society separates itself from its discredit-
able past either at an organised, official and conscious level - the deliberate cover-up or 
the rewriting of history as attempted by the Rwandan government and outlined above - or 
through a form of cultural slippage that occurs when information disappears.51
Fieldwork in Gikongoro (2004) 
In Rwanda, during fieldwork in the local districts Nyamata and Gikongoro, it became ap-
parent that even though the memory of the genocide as such was essential for all inter-
viewees, a clearer picture of the causes of the genocide and previous social cleavages had 
disappeared into ‘forgetting’. Two versions of the past can be identified: no memory and 
elite responsibility. 
49  Nora 1993, p. 11. See also Renan 1990. 
50  Cohen 2001, p. 138. 
51  Cohen 1995, p. 13. 
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No memory: 
You know, we did not know how it came. We were friends, the same people, sharing 
everything. We are innocent in this situation. (Elderly, male farmer, Nyamata) 
According to me, I cannot determine who is responsible for the genocide. We heard 
that people were being killed without knowing who planned it. (Young rural woman 
with husband in prison, Nyamata) 
Elite responsibility: 
We cannot know. It was because of the bad leadership, otherwise we were living in 
a good climate. (Elderly, male released prisoner, Nyamata rural) 
We saw genocide approaching. It was planned by intellectuals. We were innocent 
and surprised. (Elderly, male relative of released prisoner, Nyamata rural) 
It was bad governance. Authorities create divisions among Rwandans, that Tutsi 
and Hutu are different. Also, it was because of selfishness. Before 1990 ethnicities 
were living together, sharing beers, and getting married to each other. The conflict 
came after 1990. At Gikongoro, before the war, Tutsi and Hutu had good relations. 
(Young Tutsi who had been released from prison, via Ingando, after confessing his 
participation in the genocide, Gikongoro, off Rd. to Cyangugu) 
What is similar in these responses is the insistence that Hutu and Tutsi had always lived in 
harmony with the genocide constituting a sudden rupture. Another common feature of both 
the ‘no memory’ and the ‘elite responsibility’ narratives is the absence of responsibility and 
guilt. Instead, external parties, i.e. the pre-genocide government and elites, are blamed for 
causing divisions and unleashing violence. This strategy of scapegoating renders ordinary 
Rwandans collectively innocent. Consequently, for many local Hutu interviewees, all 
Rwandans were victims: while Tutsi and moderate Hutu were victims of violence and kill-
ings the mainly Hutu perpetrators were victims of manipulation and misuse, if not also vio-
lence. This explanation corresponds to the current government discourse which locates the 
cause of the genocide in divisive top-down politics,52 and which seems to be accepted by 
both Hutu and Tutsi. And yet, if one reads accounts of the genocide killings, it is apparent 
that popular participation in the genocide was not always due to coercion, but also due to 
personal motivation.53 Furthermore, without wanting to underestimate the pervasive power 
of the genocide dynamics, individual cases suggest that at least some people were able to 
say ‘no’, or to buy themselves out of having to kill.54
3.3.1 Chosen Amnesia 
At first sight, there appears to be a paradox between what is remembered and what is ‘for-
gotten’. While the event of the genocide was constantly evoked by my interviewees the 
52  Interview with Fatuma Ndangiza, Executive Secretary of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, Kigali, 
1.12.03. For a detailed discussion of collective vs. individual guilt see Eltringham 2004, ch. 4. 
53  See for instance Hatzfeld 2003. 
54  See for instance African Rights 2002. 
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causes of the genocide and the decades of tensions between Hutu and Tutsi were ignored. 
Despite earlier massacres of Tutsi in 1959, 1962 and 1973 the past was portrayed as har-
monious with the 1994 genocide being a sudden break that took everybody by surprise. 
Aspects of the past seem to be eclipsed from the discourse, creating a form of amnesia, 
albeit selective, or what can be called chosen amnesia. 
Chosen amnesia refers to two aspects: first, the term amnesia is used as an analogy for 
eclipsing the past or for not wanting to remember. Significantly, amnesia does not refer to 
a fading of memory or a different interpretation of the past, but to not wanting to draw on a 
particular recollection which is nevertheless still stored in the mind. Second, therefore,
chosen suggests a degree of agency, i.e. a conscious selection process by an individual or 
a community to eclipse sections of the past. Chosen amnesia thus signifies the deliberate 
choice to not remember some aspects of the past. 
As discussed before, while one of the functions of chosen trauma is to encourage group 
cohesion and a collective identity, chosen amnesia has the opposite effect. Through eclips-
ing memory the collective experience of an event is neglected, preventing the interpreta-
tion of a shared, group-specific past and the production of a ‘we-feeling’. Chosen amnesia 
does not introduce a sense of closure, nor is it productive of a bounded identity, but rather 
permits a more flexible inclusion and exclusion into collective identities. This might be ne-
cessary when survivors and perpetrators live together in one community. Given the con-
straints and compromises of rural life, peasants particularly often prefer not to address 
conflicts publicly in order not to destroy the delicate social balance. In Rwanda, it might 
even take two or three generations before the situation permits speaking out.55
We have to be courageous. Living in the community, we cannot live alone. A survi-
vor cannot live alone. For example, we live with a family which killed our relatives. 
We have to relax and remain confident, and pretend that there is peace. (Woman of 
mixed parentage married to Tutsi who lost all her and most of his family, Karaba 
Umudugudu, Gikongoro) 
Just after the war there were many problems. People returned from exile, there 
were also revenge killings. People could not talk to each other. Everybody was 
afraid of everybody. Today, it is as if we have forgotten everything. At the moment it 
does not exist anymore. People never talk about the past because it brings back 
bad memories and problems. We pretend it does not exist. (Elderly man who had 
just been released from prison, Nyamata) 
In essence, chosen amnesia prevents many local Rwandans from dealing with the divi-
sions which mark Rwandan society. This prevents a sense of closure and fixed boundary 
drawing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Through not referring to the underlying social cleavages 
they reduce their impact and subvert their dividing powers. This marks a deferral and de-
liberate leaving open of bounded communities, in this case Hutu or Tutsi, which is essen-
tial for day-to-day survival and peaceful coexistence. 
Moreover, eclipsing past divisions protects by-standers and participants from acknowledg-
ing guilt and at least partial responsibility for the genocide. Through blaming another agent 
external to the community, i.e. former politicians and elites, all community members are 
relieved of responsibility. This process of scapegoating permits that everybody feels victim-
55  Ntampaka 2002, p. 17. 
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ised and creates at least some sense of collective identity under the guise of victimhood. 
The danger of chosen amnesia, however, is that it leaves social antagonisms untouched 
and obstructs the transformation of the conflict. As argued by many Rwandans with whom I 
discussed the peacebuilding process, the lack of transformation is potentially dangerous 
since it leaves the society susceptible to future manipulation.  
3.4 The Transitional Justice Discourse 
Since the genocide has been a prime example of popular participation in violence the 
study assessed how Rwanda comes to terms with these crimes. Dealing with the past of a 
violent conflict or abusive regime is often referred to as transitional justice, i.e. the trans-
formation from a violent to a non-violent social and political structure.56 Despite its relative 
novelty, the concept of transitional justice is rapidly gaining prominence as a form of inter-
vention in processes of post-conflict transition and can therefore be classified as a peace-
building tool. While some scholars prefer a limited, exclusively punitive and retributive un-
derstanding of the term, it is generally used more widely to incorporate compensatory, dis-
tributive and restorative justice.57 By and large, the aim of transitional justice is to uncover 
the truth of human rights crimes, to publicly acknowledge the suffering of victims, to identify 
and punish the responsible individuals and groups, to establish the rule of law, and to con-
tribute to reconciliation.58 Importantly, the manner in which a transitional justice discourse 
is led can have significant repercussions on the transformation of a conflict. The study 
therefore explored the character of the Rwandan discourse and whether it had an effect on 
the relationship between the parties to the conflict. 
Given the magnitude of the crimes, dealing with the past is a crucial issue for Rwanda. 
Shortly after the genocide, prisons were spilling over with about 120,000 people accused 
of participating in the genocide, some of whom were innocent, and within the first years 
about 11,000 inmates died due to appalling prison conditions. Institutionally, much of the 
pre-genocide legal apparatus had been destroyed, lawyers had been killed or had fled into 
exile, or they had been involved in the genocide. Between the beginning of genocide trials 
in the classical jurisdictions in 1996 and the launch of Gacaca in 2002, only 7,000 accused 
were tried and it was estimated that the legal prosecution of all detainees would take at 
least 100 years. Faced with these challenges, the Rwandan government decided to intro-
duce a modification of the traditional village tribunals called Gacaca to deal with the enor-
mous task. 
3.4.1 Gacaca Tribunals 
The Kinyarwandan word Gacaca translates ‘law’ or ‘grass’ and refers to the holding of in-
formal community tribunals to resolve conflicts.59 Before colonialism Gacaca was the main 
justice system; they dealt with disputes about land, pastoral conflicts, household and family 
56  For a discussion of the conceptual underpinnings see Buckley-Zistel 2007c, Buckley-Zistel/Moltmann 2006. 
57  Crocker 1998. 
58  Ibid., p. 496. 
59      The following is based on Buckley-Zistel 2005a. 
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quarrels, and badly honoured contracts, and had a particular focus on reconciliation and 
community-building. 
In order to prosecute genocide offenders, today’s Gacaca have changed significantly from 
the original version since they are much more regulated, operate on a national scale and 
are no longer voluntary. Given their punitive sanctions they bear strong characteristics of 
formal justice systems.60 Even though community-building and reconciliation remain key 
objectives, it is anticipated that this will be a result of truth-telling and rendering justice. The 
jurisdictions are thus hybrids between a traditional, informal system with restorative poten-
tial and a retributive, official justice apparatus. Their objectives are to give people the 
means to solve their own problems, to speed up genocide trials, to establish the truth about 
the genocide, to render justice, to put an end to the culture of impunity and to reconcile the 
people of Rwanda.61
The weekly Gacaca sessions consist of a General Assembly comprised of local residents 
(who are predominately Hutu), elected judges and the accused. In the weakly sessions, 
everybody is free to speak, the accused defend themselves and there is no need for physi-
cal evidence, but testimonies are sufficient. Sentences can range from community work to 
life imprisonment. According to the 1996 Organic Law genocide crimes in Rwanda are 
classified in three categories of offenders:62 category 1 includes the planners and persons of 
authority who orchestrated the crimes, as well as offenders of sexual violence, category 2 
includes murderers and co-murderers, i.e. the vast group of followers, while category 3 
incorporates minor crimes such as theft and looting. While offenders of category 2 and 3 
are tried by Gacaca, category 1 offenders are subjected to classical jurisdiction. The 
Gacaca process is however not entirely independent of the justice apparatus since many 
accused appear at the hearings with a case file compiled by the Department of Public 
Prosecution.
To advance the objectives of Gacaca, the Rwandan government has introduced the possi-
bility of confession for all but category 1 offenders. Since confessing the participation in the 
genocide reduces the sentences significantly it is a very attractive incentive for most géno-
cidaires. Each confession must include all information about the crime, the incrimination of 
co-conspirators and an apology. The confessions potentially add a restorative element to 
Gacaca since they encourage apology and forgiveness and aim at the reintegration of per-
petrators.
Given the novelty of the new, modified Gacaca, the government decided to first implement 
pilot projects. These pilot tribunals, launched in June 2002, constituted about 10% of all 
Gacaca and with some delay a total of 12,000 jurisdictions commenced their work on 
March 2005. Contrary to the objective, the tribunals are operating much slower than antici-
pated and, instead of reducing the number of accused, emptying prisons and releasing the 
innocent, the confessions have led to a dramatic increase in new accusations. According 
to current estimates based on the pilot trials, the number of category 1 offences to be dealt 
with by classical jurisdictions will be approximately 50,000.63 Moreover, the total number of 
accused will be between 500,000 and 600,000, out of which about 400,000 will be in cate-
gory 2. Rather than speeding up genocide trials, they increase the number of accused, 
leading to a prolongation of the justice process.  
60  Karekezi et al. 2004, p. 74. 
61  Government of the Republic of Rwanda 2004. 
62  Initially, the law differentiated four categories but was amended in 2004. 
63  Magsam 2004, p. 9. 
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3.4.2 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Gacaca poster ‘The Truth Heals’, Kigali (2004) 
Inkiko Gacaca, ‘the truth heals’, says the caption of the nation-wide Gacaca promotion 
campaign. For the Government of Rwanda, the rationale underlying Gacaca is that truth 
leads to justice, and justice leads to reconciliation. Social healing is advanced through un-
covering past wrongs, introducing closure and moving on to a consolidated peace. It thus 
seeks to promote a discourse according to which - as the slogan of the country-wide cam-
paign advertises - truth heals and retributive and restorative justice meet. But does truth 
really heal in Rwanda?  
At this stage, an answer can merely be hypothetical since the pilot Gacaca have only just 
reached their verdict phase while all other tribunals were only launched recently. Neverthe-
less, some tenets are already visible and wider arguments about the link between truth, 
justice and reconciliation can be made.  
According to surveys, the general acceptance - and thus participation and ownership - of 
Gacaca seems positive.64 However, in interviews with official Gacaca monitors we learned 
that the actual attendance and participation in the weekly sessions is low, suggesting that 
trust and hope in the process is limited. This can also be explained by the fact that the 
mainly Hutu General Assembly prosecutes mainly Hutu génocidaires, i.e. relatives or 
friends, who they do not want to charge. Participation and ownership are also undermined 
by the fact that many Rwandans seem to be less interested in addressing the legacy of the 
genocide than in remaining silent. For instance, during Gacaca hearings - with the exemp-
tion of confessing prisoners - the involvement of the population in providing testimonies or 
general information has been rated as poor.65 Testimonies are mainly given by Tutsi survi-
vors while a ‘conspiracy of silence’ hangs over the Hutu relatives and neighbours of the 
64  See for instance Gasibirege/Babalola 2001. 
65  Karekezi et al. 2004, p. 79. 
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accused.66 Crucially, this lack of participation and ownership undermines one of the key 
aims of the tribunals, which is to give people the means to solve their own problems. 
Besides, the government’s objective to establish truth as a prerequisite for healing seems 
too optimistic. It becomes increasingly apparent that most detainees only make partial con-
fessions or only confess minor crimes, and frequently only accuse accomplices that are 
either dead or hiding abroad. Moreover inmates often appear to have organised them-
selves over the time of their detention to present consistent testimonies which spare other 
prisoners and relations.67 In the Hutu-dominated General Assembly witnesses often stay 
silent due to social pressure and because discussing such issues openly runs counter to 
Rwandan culture.68
Truth is also a casualty of fear, intimidation and corruption. For instance, in Kaduha, Gik-
ongoro district, in 2003 three Tutsi survivors, who had intended to testify in Gacaca, were 
assassinated. According to the survivors’ organisation IBUKA, these are not isolated 
cases.69 Fear does however not only silence survivors, but also the population more 
widely. In some areas local interviewees reported that perpetrators stick notes to trees 
warning community members of the repercussions of testifying. Corruption and bribery of 
judges, witnesses and survivors are additional factors with a severe truth-distorting impact. 
The government’s discourse is further based on rendering justice. However, many Rwan-
dans criticise the one-sided approach of Gacaca justice since the jurisdictions exclusively 
try crimes related to genocide - all other massacres and war crimes are excluded. This is 
particularly relevant regarding the war crimes committed by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patri-
otic Army (RPA) during its insurgency war from 1990-94 and after it brought the genocide 
to a halt. The death-toll of mainly Hutu is estimated at 25,000-45,000.70 Many of our Hutu 
interviewees expressed anger and frustration about this omission and Gacaca are often 
interpreted as ‘victor’s justice’ for those who won the insurgency. Without wanting to sug-
gest that there was a ‘double genocide’, it denies that Hutu were also victims of the war. 
Moreover, criminal and legal aspects of transitional justice are not the only concern for 
many Rwandans, but so is political and economic justice. Political justice would require a 
framework of governance in which everybody has the same rights, regardless of their eth-
nic group identity. Whether this is the case in Rwanda today was questioned by many of 
our interviewees. Although Rwanda recently held presidential and parliamentarian elec-
tions, as shall be discussed below, their outcome has been contested and some academ-
ics go as far as calling the Kagame government a dictatorship in which power is held by a 
small group of Tutsi-RPF members.71 Power, it appears, is thus still in the hands of one 
ethnic group, leading to the perception of exclusion amongst Hutu, which is potentially a 
destabilising factor. From the perspective of economic justice, in a country where 60 per 
cent of the population lives under the poverty line, the equal distribution of resources is of 
paramount importance for many Rwandans. At present, the gap between rich and poor is 
widening. Allegedly, many of the nouveaux riches in the capital are Tutsi related to the 
RPF, which perpetuates Hutu resentment against the government. Since the improvement 
of one’s economic situation was a relevant consideration during the genocide, material 
wealth remains a destabilising factor. 
Lastly, the government had hoped that the plea bargaining and confession element of 
Gacaca would not only elicit truth, but also contribute to its objective of promoting recon-
66  Molenaar 2004, p. 83. 
67  PRI 2002, p. 26. 
68  Mironko/Uvin 2003, p. 227. 
69  Interview Benoit Kaboyi, IBUKA, Kigali, 20.4.2004. See also HRW 2007. 
70  de Forge 1999, p. 728. 
71  Reyntjens 2004. 
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ciliation. However, in Rwandan culture, confessing in front of a victim is a personal insult 
and creates antagonisms.72 The attitude of prisoners is moreover often marked by arro-
gance and a show of strength rather than genuine remorse. Detainees experience strong 
pressure by the authorities to confess and to ask for pardon, which casts a shady light on 
the sincerity of the apologies.73 Many survivors are shocked by the attitude of individual 
detainees who argue that the state (and for some also God) has forgiven them and thus 
demand that the survivors do so as well.74 In other incidences, even though detainees 
have a positive attitude towards confessing they refuse to accept responsibility for their 
crimes (‘we are innocent, so why confess’) or come up with excuses or mitigating factors.75
Despite the government’s discourse according to which the truth brought about in Gacaca
heals, it appears that the process of revealing the truth - i.e. the ‘right’ memory of the past - 
often worsens the situation since it has brought the whole complexity of the legacy of the 
killings and the circumstances of today’s coexistence of victims, perpetrators and their rela-
tions to the fore. This is not simply a result of their punitive capacity, but mainly due to re-
membering the horrific past, albeit in many different ways. Even if not articulated in testi-
monies, Gacaca have returned the genocide to the communities. Where relationships be-
tween the groups were slowly improving and antagonistic identities changing, Gacaca lead 
to their renewed deterioration and division. 
As for their potential to contribute to conflict transformation, based on the experience of 
Gacaca so far the results of our fieldwork are rather sobering. The idea behind the ratio-
nale of truth leading to justice, and justice leading to reconciliation is to introduce a sense of 
closure on the (violent) past in order to move individuals and the society forwards to a 
peaceful future. This strategy has so far not been successful, though. As illustrated above, 
the tribunals lack ownership and participation which undermines the social, interactive as-
pect of truth. Moreover, the causal chain depends on whose truth, and what justice, is es-
tablished, and how. Despite much initial hope it now transpires that Gacaca cause at least 
as many problems as it can potentially solve, leading to a degree of disillusion.76
3.5 The Role of the International Development Community in Peacebuilding in 
Rwanda 
In addition to analysing internal peacebuilding discourses, the research project examined 
the role of the international development community in this process.77 The nexus between 
security, conflict and development has become a commonplace and it is now widely ac-
cepted that development assistance is not a neutral, technocratic operation, but always a 
political intervention. This can have devastating consequences, such as in Rwanda before 
the genocide. Initially, in the 1980s, the country was considered a ‘good performer’, i.e. a 
stable environment with a development-minded government, which earned the apprecia-
tion and support of many donors.78 Yet, as illustrated by Peter Uvin, despite good inten-
72  PRI 2003, p. 3-4. 
73  PRI 2004, p. 57. 
74  Ibid., p. 58. 
75  PRI 2002, p. 28. 
76  See also Ad hoc Parliament Commission on Genocide Ideology 2004. 
77  For a more extensive discussion of this aspect see Buckley-Zistel 2007a. The analysis is based on project reports 
and mission statements of international organisations as well as on participation in workshop, seminars and lobbying 
work. 
78  Piron/McKay 2004, p. 7. 
27
tions, international development assistance had a profoundly negative impact on social 
and political structures since it reinforced the already very strong government, which then 
used its powerful position to mobilise for the genocide in the early 1990s.79 External aid 
also widened the gap between rich and poor, laying the foundation for severe discontent, 
and its top-down nature - often executed by Rwandan government officials - damaged the 
self-respect of local people, making it easier for political elites to organise popular support 
for the genocide in the early 1990s.80
Fieldwork in Nyamata (2004) 
This section discusses the efforts of the international development community to undo its 
mistakes of ‘aiding violence’ and to contribute to ‘aiding peace’. Given its acknowledge-
ment of past failures, there is a strong interest in contributing to the peacebuilding process. 
3.5.1 History of International Donors’ Presence 
The relationship between the Government of Rwanda and the international development 
community has not always been easy, in particular against the backdrop of the failure of 
the international community to stop the genocide. In the early years, the government was 
severely irritated if donors channelled their funds to institutions other than itself, leading to 
the termination of the work of 38 international organisations in 1995. Today, even though 
resentment has ebbed mistrust remains and every time there is an international audience - 
79  Uvin 1998. 
80  Ibid., p. 143. 
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such as during the national genocide commemorations in April - the President, in particu
lar, uses the occasion to attack the international community. Cynically, it has been sug-
gested that the government is using the ‘genocide factor’ to blackmail members of the in-
ternational commun
-
ity into turning a blind eye to its authoritarian domestic and aggressive
81
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y Rwandan officials during interviews that they like Ger-
he post-genocide context, leading to the promotion of a 
n
 government and state actors, the second also involves working with civil society
regional politics.
The international development community in Rwanda is far from being a harmonious body
though. Rather, the individual donors differ in a number of key aspects including their atti-
tude towards the government as well as their strategies to influence it. Regarding their atti
tudes, donors can be divided into those who are critical and those who are largely uncriti-
cal of its actions.82 The former, such as France and Belgium, mainly coincide with coun-
tries that had a considerable presence before the genocide where they cooperated with th
Habyarimana regime, while the latter group is mainly composed of countries which had
little involvement before 1994, but which now see it as their moral responsibility to com-
pensate for their failure to stop the genocide. This group includes the ‘Anglophone’ donor
UK and USA, as well as Sweden and the Netherlands. Germany, Switzerland and Canad
maintained their level of support after the genocide, with only Canada striking the occa-
sional critical cord.83 The reluctance of individual donors to criticise the Government is re-
flected in the frequent remark b
mans since they never ask any questions.
Regarding the discussion about what model of liberal democracy is appropriate for 
Rwanda today, the development community can broadly be divided into three groups.84
The more critical donors France and Belgium argue that the Rwandan ethnic majority
should equal the democratic majority. This would assert much power to Hutu while render-
ing the pro-Tutsi, RPF-dominated government illegitimate. Others, including some interna-
tional human rights associations, promote a competitive democracy model such as applied
in Western countries, while the third group, which includes countries such as the UK and
Sweden, stress the sensitivity of t
concordance democracy model.
In order to have some influence on the government, two patterns of political dialogue be-
tween government and donors can be identified.85 The first can be labelled ‘constructive 
management’ and is based on Memoranda of Understanding on which both parties have
agreed. For instance, the UK, Netherlands and Sweden have signed Memoranda of Un-
derstanding with the government which include the following benchmarks: national unity
and reconciliation, conflict resolution, good governance, poverty reduction, sustainable
macro economic stability and human resources development.86 The second pattern of po-
litical dialogue is based on conditioning donor assistance to political opening through uni-
laterally determined benchmarks. While the first pattern has a strong focus on collaboratio
with the
actors.
Despite their differences in assessing the political situation of Rwanda, all donors have
made a considerable effort to promote the liberal peace agenda through supporting gov-
ernance projects and institution-building; there has been a dramatic increase in donors’
willingness to intervene in those fashionable areas of social and political engineering.87
. 36, Piron/McKay 2004, p. 26.
l. 2004, p. 101.
.
81 Reyntjens 2004.
82 Barré et al. 1999, p
83 Barré et al. 1999.
84 Kayumba et a
85 Ibid., p. 102.
86 ICCO et al. 2002, p. 6.
87 Unsworth/Uvin 2002, p. 7
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Some analysts argue that their commitment in the field is unprecedented.88 Nonetheless, 
in recognition of the nexus between poverty and conflict, they have also continued their 
more traditional work on poverty reduction, in particular through the government’s PRSP 
process.89 Yet since the governance sector has been so central to donor funding the re-
earch project assessed their efforts more closely. 
.5.2 Governance and Institution-building 
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 government policies, in particular its Vision 2020, the PRSP and specific 
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nt of budget support and the importance donors ascribe to 
upporting the government.93
s
3
Before the genocide, Rwanda had no democratic institutions to manage its ethnic differ-
ences. In the 1980 under Habyarimana, the state system was based on a quota regulation 
according to which Tutsi participation in the public realm was limited to their assumed pro
portion in the society. After the RPF-invasion in 1990 and the ensuing civil war, national
and international demands to democratise the country grew rapidly and, faced with the
potential loss of power due to the advancing RPF, international demands and internal 
competition led the Habyarimana Hutu-government to start a hate campaign against
Tutsi, which was enforced by an increasingly liberalised press and its extreme hate 
speech. It used its state institutions to mobilise the Hutu population to exterminate all Tut
After the victory of the RPF, which ended the genocide, a Government of National Unity 
and a Transitional National Assembly were established which prioritise rebuilding the stat
structures and institutions which were first misused and then destroyed in the genocide. 
For donors to Rwanda, too, strengthening the capacity of the state has been a priority. T
aspects testify for this tendency: the importance they ascribe to budget support and the 
importance they ascribe to funding the governance sector. The Rwandan government re-
ceives approximately USD 300 million in overseas development assistance (ODA) per yea
which accounts for about 60% of its public spending.90 About half of the assistance is pro
vided through budget support and the other half through projects using parallel delivery 
mechanisms and donor procedures. The budget support donors World Bank (WB), Euro-
pean Commission (EC), African Development Bank (AfDB), Sweden (Sida) and UK (DFID) 
finance the government directly through pledging large parts of their funds to its budget. At 
least 50% of their aid portfolio is donated to programmes led by the government, in indiv
ual cases such as DFID up to 2/3 of the funds go directly to the government while Sida 
only works through budget support.91 Most other donors have aligned their projects and 
programmes with
Sector Plans.
The following table provides an overview of the funding priorities of the ten main donors to
the country, indicating the exte
s
88  Barré et al. 1999, p. 15. 
89  PRSP stands for Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Individual organisations, such as OXFAM and the European 
Commission, are trying to have an impact on peace and reconciliation through development projects. 
90  World Bank 2006. 
91  Interview with programme officer at SIDA, Kigali, 22.1.04. Some donors such as USAID and Japan have domestic 
procedures which do not allow them to participate in joined funding arrangements. 
92  Ahobamuteze et al. 2006, p. 7. Republic of Rwanda 2000. Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands have explicit 
national guidelines requiring alignment. 
93  World Bank 2006. Since November 2006, French assistance to Rwanda has been threatened by a diplomatic clash 
between the two countries after a French judge sought to arrest members of the current Kigali regime, claiming their 
actions had provoked the genocide in 1994. 
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The following table provides an overview of the funding priorities of the ten main donors to 
the country, indicating the extent of budget support and the importance donors ascribe to 
supporting the government.93 
 
Top 10 donors Sector Amount 
(US$m) 
World Bank Budget support, rural development, energy, human 
resource development 
63 
United States Private sector development, health 49 
European Com-
mission 
Budget support, road infrastructure, rural development 48 
United Kingdom Budget support, governance, education 48 
Netherlands Governance, demobilization and reintegration 21 
Belgium Health 21 
Sweden Budget support 14 
Germany Governance 12 
AfDB Budget support, infrastructure and education 11 
France Culture 10 
Total   297 
 
Funding priorities of major donors 
                                                 
93  World Bank 2006. Since November 2006, French assistance to Rwanda has been threatened by a diplomatic clash 
between the two countries after a French judge sought to arrest members of the current Kigali regime, claiming their 
actions had provoked the genocide in 1994. 
In its report on ODA to Rwanda, the government separates the pledged funds into four 
general sectors: the governance sector (GS) receives 47% of all donations, the production 
and environment sector 10% (PES), the infrastructure sector 13% (IS) and the social and 
human development sector 30% (DS). The four sectors can be broken down into sub-
sectors which receive the following portions of aid:94
Sector Sub-Sector % of 
ODA 
GS General public administration (incl. government, parliament, finance, 
foreign relations, employment, statistics, debt) 
40
DS Education 11
DS Social Protection (incl. social assistance, gender, vulnerable groups) 10
DS Health 8
PES Agriculture 7,5
IS Land, housing and infrastructure 7,5
GS Justice, order and security (incl. police, security, justice, Gacaca, public 
order)
7
IS Transport and Communication 3
PES Industry and Commerce 2
IS Water and Sanitation 2
DS Youth, Culture and Sport 1
IS Energy 0.5
PES Environmental Protection 0,5
Development assistance according to sectors 
The table shows what dominant role the governance sector takes.95 Almost half of the 
ODA goes to the establishment and support of governance institutions - executive, legisla
tive and judicative - which is a considerable portion and which strengthens the state sig
cantly. 
-
nifi-
94  The Table is based on figures provided by République du Rwanda/Ministère des Finances et de la Planification 
Economique 2004, p. 7. 
95  It must be kept in mind, though, that the year under review was an election year in Rwanda where donors placed a 
particular focus on funding democratic institutions and processes. Since this data on ODA is the only one available 
alternative years cannot be considered for comparison. However, the general thrust of the findings, i.e. the strong 
emphasis of donors’ aid on funding the government and state structures, correspond with the World Bank table which 
reveals how strong the emphasis of individual donors on budget fund or the support for government institutions is. 
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In addition to budget funding and programme alignment, a considerable amount of donor 
projects are situated within government structures. This is generally the case for UNDP, 
but also, by its very nature of providing technical assistance, the German GTZ. Yet also 
explicitly non-governmental projects work within government structures. For instance, most 
of the projects of the German Civil Peace Service work in and with government institutions 
ranging from the Human Rights Commission over national youth clubs to street children 
projects.96
3.5.3 Democratisation in Rwanda 
After illustrating the strong focus of ODA on supporting democratic government institutions 
it is necessary to ask to what avail? Has their work become more transparent and demo-
cratic? Regarding transparency, Rwandan politics is affected by internal discord of which 
not much transpires out of the inner circles and important changes in personnel, for in-
stance the demission of the Prime Minister and the President in 2000, have been taken 
swiftly without public debate.97 This suggests that at least up to the 2003 elections crucial 
decisions were taken without consulting the interim parliament. Furthermore, the govern-
ment has embarked on a large amount of reforms demonstrating a strong degree of top-
down state authority on the one hand and of participatory and consultative methods on the 
other.98 Some analysts argue, however, that these consultative processes are largely pro
forma and that there is no guarantee that the views of the population, if at all articulated, 
are included in documents and legislation.99
As for democratisation, the RPF has kept a strong grip on state institutions while the 
Rwandan parliament has remained weak.100 This includes restrictions in political and civil 
liberties, making it difficult for alternative political perspectives to emerge and to gain a 
platform. In 2003, Rwanda’s post-genocide transition period officially ended with holding 
democratic presidential and parliament elections, as well as a referendum about the consti-
tution. Given the RPF’s pre-eminent position on Rwanda’s political landscape, its material 
advantages and the lack of freedom of speech which disadvantaged its opponents, Ka-
game’s and the RPF’s victory were hardly surprising.101 Kagame was confirmed with over 
95% as the President of the Republic and the RPF moved into parliament with 73% of all 
votes. Even though the EU election monitors contested that the processes were free and 
fair it can be assumed that Kagame would have anyway emerged as the clear victor since 
he stands as a guarantor for domestic security and stability, aspects which rank high on 
the list of Rwandan priorities.102 This pragmatic choice is however less an indication of a 
broad legitimacy amongst the population, but rather a sign of concern about future vio-
lence. Some Rwandans see the dominance of the RPF as a continuation of Tutsi suprem-
acy and occupation and it has been suggested that inter-ethnic relationships worsened due 
to the elections.103
96  This is partly the case because it is very difficult to work outside of the reach of the government which keeps a tight 
control on civil society activities. 
97  Hofmeier 2003, p. 10. 
98  Piron/McKay 2004, p. 19. 
99  ICCO et al. 2002, p. 22. 
100  International Crisis Group 2002. 
101  Hofmeier 2003. 
102  European Union 2004, Hofmeier 2003, p. 16. 
103  This is the impression gained in the course of your numerous interviews. Longman et al. 2004 come to a similar 
conclusion. 
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In the course of the election campaigns the largest opposition party Mouvement Démoc-
ratique Rwandais (MRD) was accused of divisionism and subsequently banned. Signifi-
cantly, even the party’s own parliamentary delegation voted for the ban, indicating the per-
vasive influence of the RPF on political developments.104 The new Rwandan constitution 
stipulates that the cabinet must consist of representatives from different parties and that 
the president, prime minister and the president of the lower house must not all belong to 
the same party. However, the constitution gives much power to the president who is solely 
authorised to appoint the prime minister and who can dissolve the parliament. Even though 
political parties can be formed, this has to take place under certain conditions: they must 
not be identified with the genocide and cannot be based on ethnicity or religion. In the past 
this has led to serious opposition to the formation of new parties, such as of the ex-
President Pasteur Bizimingu, who has subsequently been sentenced to prison.105 The 
constitution provides for a ‘Forum of Parties’ which allegedly serves to enhance the com-
munication between the parties, yet it can easily be used to control their activities, turning 
parties into proxies of the RPF. Due to the constitution’s emphasis on Rwanda’s unity, po-
litical campaigning can be easily restricted - as it is anyway at the grassroots level - limiting
pluralism, diversity and opposition. 
On a general level, despite elections and a new constitution there has been a decline in 
social and political rights essential for a functioning democracy. Freedom of press is se-
verely restricted and subject to censorship and self-censorship. Newspapers such as the 
independent Umuseso, Umuvigizi and Umuco have been harassed and prosecuted and 
their staff has been intimidated and threatened.106 In the absence of critical voices, news 
reporting remains strongly pro-government. In a similar vein, the work of civil society insti-
tutions has been seriously undermined. The report on divisionism published by the parlia-
ment in 2004 singled out five national NGOs and several religious groups and recom-
mended their banning.107 A number of international NGOs were also targeted. After wide, 
in particular international, protest the organisations were not instantly banned, but referred 
to court for legal prosecution. Not surprisingly, this led to a drastic reduction of their criti-
cism of the government and the RPF. 
Looking at these aspects it can be argued that the development of the political process is 
very much controlled by the RPF-dominated government and its institutions, limiting its 
democratic value. Central to the efforts of the RPF to control Rwanda’s political landscape 
is the fear of losing power on the one hand as well as to maintain national security and 
stability on the other. Even though the latter aspect is comprehensible, the government’s 
strategy is counterproductive, if not to say risky. The suppression of large parts of the 
population due to security concerns is a serious obstacle for the development of trust and 
hence for the government’s broader legitimacy.108 For the international development com-
munity this implies that a continuation of the support of state institutions and structures, in 
particular its strong focus of supporting the government, potentially runs counter its objec-
tive of contributing to peacebuilding. It has thus been argued, that they cannot ensure that 
the institutions they support act in the way they expect of desire.109 For institutions are not 
neutral and apolitical structures, but always reflect the intensions and motivations of those 
who put them to use. While, in Rwanda, state systems, government institutions and the 
administration function increasingly more efficiently they remain under the political influ-
104 Hofmeier 2003.
105  Bizimungu was charged with inciting civil disobedience, creating a criminal organisation, and embazzeling funds. He 
was sentenced to 15 years in prison, despite questions about the fairness of the trial by international human rights 
organisations. 
106  Amnesty International 2007. 
107  Ad hoc Parliament Commission on Genocide Ideology 2004. 
108  See also Hofmeier 2003, p. 26. 
109  Uvin 2001b, p. 186. 
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ence of the RPF, continuing a long tradition of coercive state power.110 Due to the donors’ 
institution-building strategy, much of the ODA and its power ends up in the hands of gov-
ernment officials and structures. Since one of the causes of the genocide was that external 
development led to a strong state it is surprising to see that not much has changed, de-
spite explicit ‘wake-up’calls.111
Hence, even though the impact of the international development community on the estab-
lishment of rule of law and governance institutions has been significant, serious problems 
remain regarding civil and political rights. This can be explained through the donor’s liberal 
peace discourse discussed above, which privileges building government institutions capa-
ble of implementing the new liberal values, leading to a state-centred perspective of 
peacebuilding according to which sustainable peace requires first and foremost functioning 
liberal and democratic institutions.112 This significantly limits the role of civil, and potentially 
oppositional, actors; state actors determine the input and role of civil actors, which resem-
bles a ‘victor’s peace’ in which the victor, that is the post-conflict government, determines 
the agenda of non-state actors.113
The importance ascribed to governance institutions reveals a specific understanding of the 
nature of violent conflicts, which underlies the liberal peace approach. Institutions have the 
purpose of negotiating conflicts over interests and incompatible goals. Equal participation, 
transparency and the rule of law guarantee that competing interests are managed in a fair 
and just way so that none of the parties to the conflict feels its rights to be infringed. This 
implies that individuals and groups are rational actors who calculate costs and benefits, an 
understanding of human agency which is deeply rooted in Western culture, yet not neces-
sarily in others.114 What is overlooked, though, is that conflicts are not merely fought over 
interest, but also identity aspects. As argued above, disputes operate at the levels of the 
more or less openly negotiated political demands and interests as well as at the level of 
collective experiences and attitudes central to the formation of an identity.115 What the do-
nors’ approach ignores, and what the Rwandan example reveals, is that a country does not 
only consist of state structures, but also of its people. While the existence of state struc-
tures is important for addressing conflicts over interests, conflict over identities remain 
largely untouched - and these are of particular relevance in the case of Hutu and Tutsi in 
Rwanda. As explained above, they became meaningful during colonialism and were sub-
sequently politicised and instrumentalised by ensuing regimes. Even though the divide 
became less severe in the period prior to the invasion of the RPF in 1990, today after the 
experience of mass violence and massacres it is more significant than ever. And so do the 
dichotomies between Hutu/Tutsi, us/them, friend/enemy still determine how events are 
interpreted. A social transformation, which challenges these dichotomies, has so far not 
taken place and lies in distant future. It is thus not surprising that the election victory of the 
RPF is interpreted as a continuation of Tutsi supremacy, that wealth is equated with gov-
ernment proximity and the Gacaca tribunals are seen as victor’s justice. This, however, 
escapes the attention of many international donors. 
In conclusion, even though it is on top of the donors’ agenda to contribute to peacebuilding 
and conflict transformation in Rwanda so far there has only been moderate success. This 
is mainly due to the fact that they consider post-conflict reconstruction, such as building 
institutions, to be a-political and neutral, without realising the power dynamics that work in 
110  So far, non of the country’s governments or elites were prepared to share power and this has never been met with 
much resistance from the society. Hofmeier 2003, p. 11. 
111  Uvin 2003. 
112  See also Mehler 2003, p. 10. 
113  Richmond 2005, p. 128. 
114  See also Rotte 2000, p. 41. 
115  Ropers 1997, p. 8. 
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the background which determine the work of these efforts and how they are perceived by 
the society. Instead of contributing to change, they assist in establishing the power hierar-
chies that existed prior to the genocide - even though the role of Hutu and Tutsi is now 
reversed - reproducing the conditions which led to the massacres. To finish this section 
with a quote by Peter Uvin: ‘We owe it to Rwandans to do better than we did before, and I 
am afraid we are currently failing.’116
Genocide Memorial in Ntamara, Nyamata (2003)
116  Uvin 2003b, 5. 
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4 Conclusions 
The research project ‘Between Past and Future’ examined the extent to which various 
peacebuilding discourses reduce or reproduce the antagonistic relationship between the 
parties to the Rwandan conflict and whether they lead to its transformation. This was done 
through applying a framework of analysis based on the notion of hermeneutics. Even 
though the study set out to analyse how enmity is ‘un-constructed’ in discourse and lan-
guage, in the course of the fieldwork it soon transpired that there has been little progress in 
this regard, leading to an examination as to why this is the case. Without wanting to repeat 
the findings of the study in detail this conclusion returns to the conceptual aspect of the 
research project through discussing the relevance of each of the four categories - change 
in identity, memory, power, closure - for understanding the impact of various peacebuilding 
discourses on conflict transformation in Rwanda. 
By way of introduction I suggested that to overcome a conflict, the parties need to change 
aspects of their identity so that they no longer define themselves in delineation of the other 
group and the study asked, if and how this is happening in Rwanda today. The findings are 
rather sobering. Despite explicit efforts, for instance by the government, the country re-
mains deeply divided. Collective identities are produced and reproduced through the 
choosing of trauma or amnesia, i.e. through establishing clear demarcations between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ or through leaving them deliberately unaddressed. Belonging to a particular 
group determines attitudes towards issues such as how to commemorate the genocide, 
who constitutes victims and perpetrators, whether or not to participate in Gacaca and how 
to interpret the politics of the Rwandan government. 
This is closely intertwined with the second aspect identified in the hermeneutic framework: 
remembering. In Rwanda, the memory of the past - for instance in form of the commemo-
rations, but also in informal ways of choosing trauma or forgetting or in struggles to bring to 
light the truth about the genocide during Gacaca tribunals - is dividing rather than uniting. 
The particular recollections of the past have a profound impact on the future for they stand 
in the way of addressing the lingering tensions, leaving them susceptible to manipulation 
and incitement by political entrepreneurs. 
The third aspect of the hermeneutic framework is to analyse how political, economic and 
social power hierarchies determine the transformation process. In this study, the role of the 
government has been especially highlighted, even though it is not the only powerful actor 
in the society, as became evident in the discussion of the Gacaca tribunals. Still, its au-
thoritarian politics both in day-to-day matters in general and in the national reconciliation 
process in particular have a negative impact on the transformation of the conflict since it 
provokes antagonism and resentment amongst large parts of the population. On a more 
subtle level, the government controls what is subject to public debate and what is ex-
cluded, which has a significant impact on how the genocide will be remembered and nar-
rated in the future. 
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Memorial in Cyangugu (2004) 
This leads to the fourth aspect of the framework of analysis. Above I suggested that, in 
order to contribute to the transformation of a conflict, discourses promoted by peacebuild-
ing efforts should not introduce a sense of closure which eradicates differences. Trying to 
make all Rwandans the same, regardless of the particular features of their identity group, 
does not only deprive people of their identity and what they believe in, but it also under-
mines any possibility to discuss the conflict in a constructive manner in order to reach 
some agreement - if only about the legitimacy of group-specific perspectives and experi-
ences.
In sum, at least regarding the peacebuilding discourses analysed by this research project, 
the study concludes that they, by-and-large, leave the antagonistic relationships between 
the identity groups Hutu and Tutsi unaddressed and thus have only a limited impact on the 
transformation of the conflict. By way of conclusion the question arises whether there are 
alternative paths for Rwanda to deal with its violent past. Needless to say, there cannot be 
an easy answer. It is however my contention that opening up the debate, both politically 
and socially, might be a first step to address the underlying tensions. This would entail not 
to focus on establishing the ‘right’ history of the country in order to determine who is victim 
and who perpetrator, but rather to assess why each individual group draws on a particular 
repertoire of memories and why it strives towards legitimating its identity group and posi-
tion. An answer to this question might include accepting that guilt and responsibility are not 
always one-sided and that it does not run along ethnic lines. While realising that this lies in 
distant future, given the enormity of the crime, the challenge for Rwandans today is 
whether they approach this vision - or move further away. 
It is here, too, where external actors have some responsibility. It is therefore necessary 
that the donors widen their scope from considering interest to identity aspects of conflicts. 
Democratic structures and institutions might be a necessity after violent conflicts but they 
require a demos that is willingly to accept and work within them. In Rwanda, the existence 
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of an identity-crossing demos still lies in the distant future and needs special consideration 
during planning and implementation of development projects. 
This could, for instance, be done in the light of the Gacaca tribunals. While new resent-
ment is not surprising during a truth seeking process, in order to reduce the negative con-
sequences the communities require a safety-net to be able to deal with the renewed mis-
trust and friction. In order to turn at least some of the processes around, it might thus be 
helpful to complement Gacaca with trust and confidence-building measures and commu-
nity or victim-offender mediation. While this might not resolve all dilemmas revealed by 
Gacaca it might nevertheless lessen its negative impact. Critically, to increase ownership 
confidence-building projects should not be on an institutionalised, national scale, but situ-
ated in the local communities. A small number of projects by Rwandans already exist and 
their expansion should be supported. This complementation of Gacaca justice could then 
lead to a more sustainable transformation of the conflict. 
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5 Transfer of Findings and Future Research 
Much has been written about Rwanda and the country continues being in the focus of re-
search and analysis. While much of the research concentrates on the genocide and its 
causes, studies about the conflict transformation process are still rare, with the exemption 
of the Gacaca tribunal. Between Past and Future’s contribution to the field is that it analy-
ses the impact of the various discourses of dealing with the past as well as the identity poli-
tics behind them. In particular its local focus in Gikongoro and Nyamata is unique and has 
provided important insights. 
Areas of concern for future studies could be to continue analysing the Gacaca tribunals, 
the democratisation process and, of course, the conflict transformation process. This could 
also be linked to issues such as regional peace and security, security sector reform and 
the demobilisation of ex-combatants, as well as an assessment of conflicts over land 
rights, one of the most pressing issues in the impoverished country. A further area of re-
search could be a comparison between the peacebuilding discourse in Rwanda and Bu-
rundi. The latter follows a different strategy involving an open dialogue between all parties 
as well as power-sharing between Hutu and Tutsi government officials. 
Regarding the conceptional aspect of this study, the framework for analysing conflict trans-
formation processes in divided societies has a much broader relevance than post-genocide 
Rwanda and can be transferred to other post-conflict societies. In this sense, this study 
marks a first step of establishing a new research agenda in peace and conflict studies and 
hopes to inspire similar projects. 
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